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Introduction 
2016 marks the 20th anniversary of the introduction of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996. In 
conjunction with the Family Law Act 1995, the 1996 Act plays a leading role in regulating the 
consequences of marital breakdown in Ireland, governing, specifically, the remedy of divorce.1 
Notwithstanding, as the Supreme Court recently pointed out, that the range of issues which can 
arise in matrimonial proceedings is ‘wide and varied’,2 one of the major areas of contention on 
marital breakdown is often that of ancillary relief provision. Pursuant to Part II of the Family Law Act 
1995 and Part III of the 1996 Act, considerable discretion is placed in the hands of the judiciary to 
effect an equitable redistribution of property on judicial separation or divorce which makes ‘proper 
provision’ for a dependent spouse and children.3 Mitigating the harshness associated with the 
prevailing separate property regime and in theory allowing the judiciary the flexibility to achieve the 
optimum outcome in any individual case, the scheme provides potentially important protection for 
financially vulnerable spouses.4  
Despite its positive attributes, however, significant shortcomings in the approach currently adopted 
in Ireland have emerged. Unfortunately, the lack of legislative (or judicial) guidance on what might 
constitute ‘proper provision’, in addition to the apparent inconsistency of judicial decision-making in 
the area, are liable to severely hamper the ability of spouses to reach a fair settlement in private 
ordering. Moreover, although as Eekelaar suggested, ‘it seems essential to responsible negotiation 
for both sides to know how far they are accepting a deviation from the default outcome’,5 such 
awareness is generally lacking in an Irish context. This article briefly considers the difficulties 
inherent in the Irish ancillary relief scheme and highlights the vulnerability of financially weaker 
spouses, particularly women, at the point of divorce. The article calls for a comprehensive review 
and reform of the ancillary relief scheme applied. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 For an analysis of the context in which divorce was introduced in Ireland see, L Crowley, ‘Irish Divorce Law in 
a Social Policy Vacuum – From the unspoken to the unknown’ (2011) 33(3) JSWFL 227. 
2
 MD v ND [2015] IESC 16 at [4.1] per Clarke and MacMenamin JJ (joint judgment). 
3
 ‘Proper provision’ is also constitutionally mandated, see Article 41.3.2° of the Irish Constitution. Equitable 
redistribution was first introduced in Ireland almost 30 years ago in the Judicial Separation and Family Law 
Reform Act 1989. 
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 Dewar, ‘Reducing Discretion in Family Law’ (1997) 11 AJFL 309 argued that reliance on judicial discretion in 
family law was first reflective of ‘technocratic liberalism’ meaning ‘a reposing of faith in the ability of experts, 
when armed with sufficient information, to arrive at optimal solutions for the parties, with “optimal” for these 
purposes being cast in economic or therapeutic, rather than moral or ethical, terms’. However, he was 
sceptical about the ability of a court to know what is best in any case.  
5
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Weaknesses of ancillary relief scheme  
Notwithstanding the undoubted malleability of equitable redistribution regimes and their inherent 
ability to facilitate the provision of individualised justice,6 the weaknesses of the specific approach 
applied in Ireland through the Family Law Act 1995 and the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996, appear to 
outweigh its positives.  
The overriding difficulty of the Irish regime is the extremely wide discretion afforded to the judiciary 
in the exercise of its powers. Although certain parameters do exist, in particular the legislative and 
constitutional duty to make ‘proper provision’ for a dependent spouse and children, and the 
requirement to consider certain statutory factors enumerated in the legislation, the practical effect 
of these limitations in restricting or guiding the exercise of judicial discretion appears in many cases 
to be marginal.7 Unsurprisingly in this context, serious inconsistency has emerged in judicial 
decision-making. Not only is this weakness evident in reported judgments, but it is becoming more 
and more apparent with the findings of each new empirical research project conducted. In 2007, 
Buckley reported inconsistent outcomes on the basis of her analysis of 89 case file questionnaires 
completed by 44 practicing family law solicitors in 2002.8 Similar inconsistency was noted by Coulter 
in her empirical research conducted in the Irish Circuit Courts from 2007-20099 and again by O’Shea 
in 2014 in her analysis of 40 case files and observation of 1,087 unique cases in the eight Irish Circuit 
Courts between October 2008 and February 2012.10  
Where there is such extensive discretion vested in the judiciary, the ability of parties to reach an out-
of-court settlement in the ‘shadow of the law’ is also severely compromised. As Crowley observed, 
‘in essence parties are effectively negotiating… in the dark’.11 The difficulties created for both 
lawyers and their clients in such circumstances are considerable. It has been noted elsewhere:  
‘If the law appears to offer only the prospect of the exercise of an unfettered judicial 
discretion based on no discernible principle, a lawyer’s advice will inevitably be speculative 
and clients may feel that their affairs are out of their control. They may feel that they are 
drawn into a free-for-all of haggling in which one side makes an inflated claim and the other 
tries to beat it down. Much may be thought to depend on which judge might decide the case 
and the lawyer’s knowledge of the judge’s propensities. Such a process does not facilitate 
the settlement of property matters by restrained and orderly negotiation. It increases 
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animosity and bitterness between the parties and in the parties’ attitudes to the law and 
lawyers.’12  
The effects of such a highly discretionary regime and the attendant uncertainty weigh particularly 
heavily on financially weaker spouses who are in a very precarious bargaining position.13 As 
Parkinson notes:  
‘The system invites litigation from risk-takers. It is also weighted against the risk-averse and 
those who cannot afford to litigate. These people are at the mercy of the low “take-it-or-
leave-it” offer.’14  
In considering who may be vulnerable to such offers, it appears that Irish women are liable to be 
particularly ‘risk-averse’ at the point of divorce. Recent sociological data seems to bear this out.  
Continued economic disparity between men and women 
Drawing from the Survey on Income and Living Conditions for 2010, work patterns of male and 
female partners in couple households, including though not limited to married couples, were 
recently analysed.15 A number of trends emerged which illustrate the potentially precarious financial 
position of many women on divorce. First, although the male inactivity rate in couple households in 
2010 was 28%, the female inactivity rate was more than 50% higher at 43%. Second, male and 
female partners differed greatly in relation to full-time work: while 64% of men in couple households 
worked full-time, only 35% of women did likewise.16 By contrast, women were much more likely to 
engage in part-time work with 22% doing so in comparison to a mere 8% of men.17 Moreover, 
despite the shift away from the traditional male breadwinner work pattern, characterised by male 
partner full-time work and female partner joblessness or part-time work, the male breadwinner 
model continued to exist in 38% of couple households.18 Female breadwinner households, although 
increased, were much less common and only recorded in 9% of couple households.19   
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 The British Columbia Law Reform Commission, Property Rights on Marriage Breakdown (Working Paper No. 
63–1989) V(D)(1)(f) quoting the Australian Law Reform Commission (citation omitted).  
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 Note, although practitioner knowledge of a local judge’s preferences and trends may offset some of the 
uncertainty in trying to reach a settlement, this will only apply where there the known judge is guaranteed to 
be hearing the case and experienced local legal representation is secured. Such knowledge will not be available 
to parties seeking to reach a settlement without legal representation, where a non-local or inexperienced legal 
practitioner is retained or where there are multiple judges sitting on a rotational basis such as in the Dublin 
Circuit Family Court. 
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 P Parkinson, ‘Reforming the Law of Family Property’ (1999) 13 AJFL 117. See also J Scherpe, ‘Marital 
Agreements and Private Autonomy in Comparative Perspective’ in J Scherpe (ed) Marital Agreements and 
Private Autonomy in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Hart, 2012) p476. 
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 F McGinnity, H Russell, D Watson, G Kingston & Elish Kelly, Winners and Losers? The Equality Impact of the 
Great Recession in Ireland (Dublin: Equality Authority and the Economic and Social Research Institute, 2014), 
pp25-26. 
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Irish women’s reduced participation in the labour market has, in particular, long been influenced by 
the presence of children.20 Factors including ‘a lack of affordable childcare, comparatively low 
governmental provision for combining work and caring … welfare and tax systems that support male 
breadwinner household arrangements and traditional attitudes about gender roles’ have all 
contributed to low labour market participation rates among mothers.21 As a result, although the 
activity rates of women with young children increased over the period of the economic boom, 
considerable differences in participation rates according to the age and number of children have 
remained. In particular, the ‘strong negative effects’ of the presence of pre-school children on the 
probability of labour market participation of the mother continue to be observed.22 It has been 
suggested that the presence of pre-school children reduces the likelihood of participation of the 
mother by between 17% and 20%, with the presence of children between 5 and 12 years old 
reducing the probability by between 7% and 9%.23  In addition to the immediate effect this has on 
labour market activity rates, the impact of such child care can also have longer term negative effects 
on the carer’s ability to return to the labour market, especially after a period of full-time caring.24 
Finally, statistics released by the Equality Authority and the Economic and Social Research Institute 
in October 2014 demonstrate that women in couple households were significantly harder hit by 
Government austerity policies since 2008 than their male counterparts.25 The statistics showed that 
women’s individual incomes were reduced by more than men’s incomes for each income group.26  
Consequently, the financial vulnerability of married women, particularly married mothers, at the 
point of divorce often remains acute and this gender dimension, despite being reduced, ought not to 
be discounted. Not only are they more likely to have reduced savings due to decreased labour 
market activity and the differential impact of Government austerity policies, they are also less likely 
to have Personal Retirement Savings Accounts or private pensions.27 Moreover, they are liable to 
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p11. This is especially important as ‘the extent of downward mobility for those who move out of the labour 
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See Jo Miles and Rebecca Probert ‘Sharing Lives, Dividing Assets: Legal Principles and Real Life’ in Jo Miles and 
Rebecca Probert (eds), Sharing Lives, Dividing Assets (Hart Publishing 2009) p20. Although this comment 
related to another jurisdiction, the point is equally likely to be true in Ireland. 
25
 C Keane, T Callan & J Walsh, Gender Impact of Tax and Benefit Changes: A Microsimulation Analysis (Dublin: 
Equality Authority and the Economic and Social Research Institute, 2014). 
26
 Ibid pp42-43. This fall was largely attributable to cuts in child benefit (which the report allocates to the 
mother as the usual recipient) and social welfare payments. 
27
 See the Irish Longitudinal Study on Ageing, ‘Fifty Plus in Ireland 2011’ 
http://tilda.tcd.ie/assets/pdf/glossy/Tilda_Master_First_Findings_Report.pdf [Accessed 28 April 2014] pp233-
234. See also D Price, ‘Pension Accumulation and Gendered Household Structures: What are the Implications 
of Changes in Family Formation for Future Financial Inequality?’ in J Miles and R Probert (eds), Sharing Lives, 
Dividing Assets (Hart Publishing 2009). 
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face considerable challenges when seeking to return to the workforce if they have engaged in a 
period of full-time caring. 
Need for reform 
In the absence of large scale empirical data analysing settlements reached informally in Ireland, it is 
not possible to say definitively that financially weaker spouses, husbands or wives, are not achieving 
economically just outcomes in private ordering pursuant to the current ancillary relief regime. 
However, the probability that these spouses are in a weaker bargaining position vis-à-vis their 
financially stronger spouse appears highly likely, with financially weaker spouses seemingly at the 
mercy of Parkinson’s ‘low “take-it-or-leave-it” offer’.28 Furthermore, although in theory the court is 
constitutionally required to ensure proper provision is made for a dependent spouse prior to 
granting a decree of divorce, evidence suggests that the provision made in out-of-court settlements 
is not always reviewed to ensure compliance with this requirement prior to a decree being 
granted.29 
Conscious of these shortcomings, a number of commentators have called for reform of the Irish 
ancillary relief scheme.30 A common denominator in the proposals for reform advanced is the need 
to ensure a more transparent, predictable and consistent approach to ancillary relief provision. One 
way in which this could be achieved could be through the introduction of a deferred community of 
property scheme adopting a hybrid rule-based/discretionary approach.31 While spouses could, as a 
default, share the community fund equally on divorce, residual discretion could nonetheless remain 
with the court to order a reapportionment of assets between spouses where equal sharing would be 
clearly unfair, having regard to specified criteria.32 Moreover, an income-sharing formula akin to that 
applied under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines in Canada could be adopted to address issues 
regarding spousal support.33 Explicit objectives of the overall regulatory process could also be 
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 See above. The costs of pursuing litigation are often considered prohibitive and such action may not be a 
viable alternative for financially weaker spouses. Although Legal Aid is currently available to individuals whose 
disposable income is less than €18,000, some contributions are still required and serious delays may be 
incurred. Moreover, many spouses will not be eligible but may still be in a financially vulnerable position. 
29
 See K O’Sullivan, ‘Rethinking Ancillary Relief on Divorce in Ireland: The Challenges and Opportunities' (2016) 
36(1) Legal Studies 111. 
30
 See ibid; L Crowley, 'Dividing the Spoils on divorce: rule-based regulation versus discretionary-based 
decision' (2012) Int’l FL 388;  LA Buckley, ‘Matrimonial Property and Irish Law: A Case for Community’ (2002) 
53 NILQ 39; F de Londras, Principles of Irish Property Law (Dublin: Clarus Press, 2nd edn, 2011) p242. For 
earlier proposals advocating for the adoption of a community of property approach to family property, see P 
O’ Connor, Key Issues in Irish Family Law (Roundhall 1988) who suggested the introduction of a system of 
immediate community of property. See also Report of the Commission on the Status of Women (Stationary 
Office 1972) 175. 
31
 A full analysis of this proposal is outside the scope of this article. For more, however, see K O’Sullivan, 
‘Rethinking Ancillary Relief on Divorce in Ireland: The Challenges and Opportunities' (2016) 36(1) Legal Studies 
111. 
32
 What would constitute the pool of assets to be divided would have to be carefully considered. In addition to, 
perhaps, assets used for a family purpose, it may also include pension contributions made during the marriage, 
thereby redressing the imbalance noted above. For a fuller discussion of what the community of assets might 
encompass, see K O’Sullivan, ‘Rethinking Ancillary Relief on Divorce in Ireland: The Challenges and 
Opportunities' (2016) 36(1) Legal Studies 111. 
33
 See the Department of Justice Canada, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (July 2008) 
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developed, with residual discretion resting with the judiciary to adjust the overall provision made 
between spouses pursuant to the above regime having regard to these stated objectives.34 Although 
doubts would undoubtedly be raised as to the viability of such reform, particularly from a 
constitutional perspective in light of the failure of the Matrimonial Home Bill 1993,35 it is submitted 
such a proposal could be drafted in a manner to best ensure its constitutional compliance.36 Such 
reform would bring much needed certainty to the ancillary relief scheme applied in Ireland while 
retaining important flexibility for the closely circumscribed situations where the exercise of judicial 
discretion is warranted. 
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding that, to date, there has been no discernible interest at a legislative level in Ireland 
in tackling the serious weaknesses associated with the ancillary relief scheme applied in the 
jurisdiction, the need for a more certain approach, ensuring greater foreseeability and consistency, 
is undeniable. Considering the equitable redistribution scheme applied across the Irish Sea, 
Professor Cooke, former Law Commissioner for England and Wales, observed:  
‘[F]ar too high a value is being placed upon the supposed ability to do individual justice, and 
insufficient value on predictability. The cost, to divorcing couples, of flexibility must be 
greater than the cost of clear principle.’37  
As this article demonstrates, the ‘cost of flexibility’ appears to be particularly heavily incurred by 
financially weaker spouses seeking to reach an out-of-court settlement. In light of the high level of 
uncertainty which currently prevails, financially vulnerable spouses in Ireland are liable to find 
themselves in a very weak bargaining position and potentially void of meaningful protection. In 
particular, on the basis of the research considered above, it appears women may be in an especially 
vulnerable position at the point of divorce.  
As we mark the 20th anniversary of the introduction of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996, it would 
seem an appropriate time to undertake a comprehensive review of the ancillary relief scheme 
applied in Ireland with a view to reform. Let us hope the opportunity will finally be grasped. 
(Note, this research was published as ‘Ancillary Relief and Private Ordering: The vulnerability of 
financially weaker spouses’ (2016) 19(1) Irish Journal of Family Law 3-6). 
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